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FICHTE AND HEGEL ON RECOGNITION 
It is now widely acknowledged that Hegel’s account of mutual ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) is 
influenced by Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. 
Yet whilst much has been written on this topic, little has been written, as far as I am aware, on 
Hegel’s criticisms of Fichte’s account of recognition.1 In this paper I provide an interpretation 
of Hegel’s account of recognition in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s 
account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In order to grasp the full 
import of Hegel’s critique a proper understanding of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 
Foundations is necessary. In the first three sections of this paper I argue that Fichte’s account 
of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I 
then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s 
conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a 
comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with 
recognition as a moral attitude.  
 
 1. Fichte on the relationship between right and morality 
In order to understand Fichte’s account of recognition in the Foundations of Natural Right, it 
is necessary to understand his infamous claim that the sciences of right and morality are 
distinct, autonomous disciplines. This claim shapes Fichte’s account of recognition in the 
Foundations.2 
 The science of right, as Fichte understands it, concerns politics and law. (Although 
there is no English equivalent for the German ‘Recht’, the domain of the science of right 
corresponds, roughly, to those of political philosophy and jurisprudence.3) The science of 
morality, as Fichte understands it, is concerned with determining our duties and providing a 
standard for the moral appraisal of actions. It determines our duties with reference to 
unconditionally binding universal principles and attributes moral worth to actions just in case 
they are motivated by duty alone. Fichte thus conceives of morality in Kantian terms.  
In his 1793 work, Contributions intended to Correct Public Opinion Concerning the 
French Revolution, Fichte attempts to base the science of natural right upon the science of 
morality by deriving inalienable natural rights from the moral law.4 By the time he comes to 
write the Foundations of Natural Right in 1796, Fichte has abandoned this position in favour 
of a strict distinction between the sciences of right and morality. This shift in position was 
prompted by his growing appreciation of Kant’s political philosophy as expounded in the 
1784 Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim and the 1795 Toward Perpetual 
Peace. In these texts, Kant suggests that the problems of political philosophy should be 
formulated and solved independently of those of moral philosophy. Kant claims that political 
philosophy cannot proceed on the assumption that agents have good wills, that is, are 
disposed to act from duty. It must rather proceed on the opposite assumption, namely, that 
agents are driven by inclination and self-interest. As Kant puts it in Toward Perpetual Peace, 
the ‘problem of establishing a state’ must be ‘soluble even for a nation of devils’. 5   
 Despite the apparent intractability of the problem so conceived, Kant presents a 
remarkably simple solution to it. If agents are fashioned from ‘crooked timber’6 all that is 
needed is an ‘enclosure’ in which their crookedness will be gradually transformed into 
rectitude. The establishment of such an enclosure would require rules guaranteeing the 
protection of the freedom of all. These rules would regulate intersubjective relations in such a 
way that agents driven by self-seeking interest alone would each come to restrict their own 
freedom. The state constituted by such an enclosure would grant each citizen a private sphere 
of freedom protected by rights.  
Now, a crucial upshot of Kant’s solution is a clear distinction between right and 
morality. For right is not that which secures the conditions for the possibility of my acting 
from duty—it is that which guarantees the co-existence of free agents, irrespective of their 
moral dispositions.7 Fichte was greatly impressed with Kant’s distinction between right and 
morality, and so it is perhaps not incorrect to speak, with Druet, of Fichte’s ‘conversion’ to 
Kant’s political philosophy.8 For Fichte is convinced, as is Kant, that it must be possible for 
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right to be realized independently of morality. It is this conviction that leads Fichte to separate 
the sciences of right and morality. This separation receives its clearest exposition in the 
Foundations of Natural Right of 1796-7.  
 In this work Fichte argues that the sciences of right and morality have discrete, 
separate domains. The science of morality is concerned with determining what our duties are 
and with whether actions are done from duty. Its domain is the ‘inner’ domain of conscience 
which Fichte regards as cognitively inaccessible to other rational agents. The science of 
natural right, by contrast, is concerned with determining rules which govern publicly 
observable interaction between rational agents.9 It is not concerned with whether or not agents 
act from duty. According to Fichte: 
 
In the domain of natural right, the good will has no role to play. Right must be enforceable, 
even if there is not a single human being with a good will; the very aim of the science of right 
is to sketch out such an order of things. 10  
 
Such an ‘order of things’ is very similar to Kant’s enclosure for a people of devils. The agents 
within this order are assumed to be capable of being motivated by self-interest alone: ‘we 
have assumed’, Fichte writes, that ‘persons are motivated only by self-love and not 
morality’.11 At several places in the Foundations, Fichte clearly states that he is assuming 
what he calls ‘egoism’ (in §16 he refers to the ‘assumption of universal egoism’).12 Fichte’s 
‘egoism’ is not quite the same as what we would today call ‘psychological egoism’, the 
empirical claim that all agents are only ever motivated by self-interest, that is, that our 
ultimate desires are all self-directed.13 Fichte’s ‘egoism’ is the claim that it is possible for 
agents to be motivated by self-interest alone, and this is quite compatible with the existence of 
other, non-self-regarding motives, and the possibility of agents acting upon such motives as 
ultimate motives. In what follows, I shall use the term ‘egoism’ in this sense.  
Fichte is thus assuming the possibility that agents can be motivated by self-interest 
alone, and is designing his state on the basis of this assumption. He is designing an 
‘enclosure’ in which Kantian ‘devils’, should there be any, could peacefully co-exist. This 
enclosure, by guaranteeing freedom for all, provides a ‘space’ for the realization of the human 
being’s capacity for morality. Within the Fichtean state morality can flourish, although 
whether it actually will flourish is not a question for the science of right. 
Proceeding on the assumption of egoism, Fichte claims that every agent could be 
predisposed to pursue his or her own interests to the exclusion of the interests of others. If this 
were the case, each agent would expect every other agent to be similarly predisposed. As a 
consequence of this, a situation of universal mistrust would arise. This would undermine any 
good-faith agreement, and would lead to a condition of total ‘insecurity’ (Unsicherheit). 
Agents might then, Fichte claims, resort to violence to achieve their ends and if this 
happened, a ‘war of all against all’ (Krieg aller gegen alle) might ensue.14  
Fichte’s position here is at the antipodes of his position in the Contributions. In that 
work he argued that humanity had a potential for moral development and rejected the 
conception of a ‘state of nature’ as a ‘war of all against all’ as false.15 Here, by contrast, he is 
assuming the possible truth of such a conception. This assumption has a profound impact 
upon Fichte’s conception of natural right. Principles of right are now conceived of as practical 
norms which regulate the interaction of agents that are capable of being motivated by self-
interest alone. Such agents cannot be trusted to act in accordance with principles of right and 
are quite capable of violating the rights of others if this will maximise their own welfare. As 
Alain Renaut has pointed out, this necessitates an element of ‘coercion’ (Zwang) in the 
Fichtean state.16 Self-interested agents must be coerced to act in accordance with right, and 
this coercion works by making the agent’s welfare conditional upon his adherence to the 
principles of right. The agent motivated by self-interest alone will care about the rights of 
others only insofar as his own rights are made to depend upon them.17  
Fichte’s new conception of the relationship between right and morality thus radically 
alters the nature of his political philosophy. Insofar as recognition is a central part of Fichte’s 
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political philosophy we might expect that it is also affected. With this in mind, let us turn to 
his account of recognition in the Foundations of Natural Right. 
 
2. Recognition in the Foundations of Natural Right 
In §§1-4 of the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte provides a ‘deduction’ of the concept 
of right. A ‘deduction’, as Fichte understands it, is a transcendental argument. Fichte’s 
deduction attempts to demonstrate that possession of the concept of right—which denotes 
an intersubjective relationship of mutual recognition—is a necessary condition of the 
possibility of ‘self-consciousness’. The self-consciousness in question is the ‘practical’ 
self-consciousness of a ‘finite rational being’.18 Practical self-consciousness, for Fichte, is 
the capacity to conceive of oneself as a free self-determining agent. Fichte also refers to 
this capacity as ‘individuality’ (Individualität) or ‘personality’ (or ‘personhood’—
Persönlichkeit).19 
 Fichte’s transcendental argument proceeds as follows: In order to be practically 
self-conscious I must, Fichte claims, be able to ascribe a capacity for ‘free efficacy’ to 
myself.20 A capacity for free efficacy is a capacity to set ends and to will to realize them.21 
Now in the case of finite rational beings, this capacity is limited and constrained by a 
mind-independent ‘not-I’—the ‘sensible world’ or nature. If the finite rational being is to 
attain practical self-consciousness, it must posit this activity as limited by the ‘sensible 
world’. And this obviously entails that it must possess the belief in the existence of such a 
world.22 But here we encounter a problem. For, according to Fichte, we can possess this 
belief only if we have already ascribed a capacity for free efficacy to ourselves. But we 
can ascribe a capacity for free efficacy to ourselves, Fichte thinks, only if we possess the 
belief in the existence of a sensible world. In other words, the self-ascription of a capacity 
for free efficacy and the possession of a belief in a mind-independent world mutually 
condition one another. We can give priority to neither in the chain of transcendental 
conditions and are thus caught in an impasse. Fichte claims that the only way to exit this 
impasse is to conceive of a situation in which both conditions are satisfied 
simultaneously.23 In such a situation my self-ascription of free efficacy and my positing of 
a mind-independent world, or ‘object’ (as Fichte now puts it24), would be ‘synthetically 
united’ so that in comprehending the object I would ascribe a capacity for free efficacy to 
myself. But this does not seem terribly helpful. For, according to Fichte, the object is 
supposed to present the subject’s free efficacy to it and the nature of this efficacy is to be 
‘absolutely free and self-determining’.25 Yet to comprehend an object is, ordinarily, to 
encounter it as a constraint on one’s free activity. The object in question thus seems to 
possess contradictory powers. It is supposed to present the subject’s unlimited capacity for 
free activity to it and thus enable it to ascribe this capacity to itself. Yet it must also, as an 
object, constrain or determine the subject in some way. This seems a straightforward 
contradiction. However, Fichte thinks that we can avoid contradiction if we: 
 
think of the subject’s being-determined as its being-determined to be self-determining, i.e. 
as a summons [eine Aufforderung] to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise its 
efficacy.26 
 
The object thus determines the subject to manifest its free efficacy—it ‘forces’ the subject to 
be free. Indeed, even if the subject chooses to ignore the summons, chooses not to respond, it 
has still, provided that it has understood the summons, exercised its capacity for free efficacy. 
The object which issues the summons is clearly, Fichte claims, another rational agent, and the 
relationship between subject and object is consequently an intersubjective relationship.27 
Fichte has thus deduced an intersubjective relationship as a condition of the possibility of 
practical self-consciousness.  
Having deduced an intersubjective relationship, Fichte now proceeds to argue that it 
must be a relationship of a specific type. According to Fichte, the summoning subject issues 
the summons because it recognizes the subject as a potentially free rational being. In issuing 
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the summons, the summoning subject restricts its free activity, thereby providing a ‘sphere’ in 
which the other may manifest its free activity. This sphere allows the subject to constitute 
itself as an ‘individual’—a free rational being with specific characteristics—by freely 
choosing from the possibilities available to it. Now the summoning subject’s judgement that 
the subject is a free rational being is, in Fichte’s terminology, ‘problematic’. That is, the 
summoning subject does not know for certain whether the other subject is rational. It merely 
thinks that this is possible, and its recognition of the subject is based upon this possibility. 
The summoning subject’s judgement will only become necessarily true—‘categorical’, in 
Fichte’s terminology—if it is confirmed by the activity of the subject. The subject, if it has 
fully understood the summons, recognizes the summoning subject as a free rational being. It 
must exhibit this recognition in action by limiting its free activity so that the other subject 
may exercise its free activity. The subject must exhibit this recognition in action, as this is the 
only way that it can ratify the summoning subject’s judgement. If the subject fails to act, it 
fails to confirm the other’s judgement, and the other is entitled to withdraw its problematic 
recognition. The other will continue to recognize me only if I recognize it and exhibit my 
recognition in action. Fichte therefore argues that recognition can take place only if it is 
mutual or reciprocal: 
 
Thus the relation of free beings to one another is a relation of reciprocal interaction through 
intelligence and freedom. One cannot recognize the other if both do not mutually recognize 
each other [beide sich gegenseitig anerkennen]; and one cannot treat the other as a free being, 
if both do not mutually treat each other as free.28 
 
The intersubjective relationship that is the condition of the possibility of practical self-
consciousness is thus a relationship of mutual recognition. By virtue of this relationship each 
subject obtains a ‘sphere’ for the exercise of its free efficacy. Fichte claims that in order to 
secure the continued existence of this sphere I must undertake a commitment to recognize any 
rational being that I may encounter. As Fichte puts it: 
 
 I must in all cases recognize the free being outside of me as a free being, i.e., I must limit my 
freedom through the concept of the possibility of his freedom.29 
 
This is the ‘principle of right’ (Rechtssatz), which safeguards the ‘relation of right’ 
(Rechtsverhältnis): 
 
each is to limit his freedom through the concept of the possibility of the other’s freedom, 
under the condition that the latter likewise limit his freedom through the freedom of the 
former.30 
 
This relation of right is the relation of mutual recognition. If the relation of right is disturbed 
or destroyed the subject’s sphere of freedom may be encroached or destroyed and this will  
impede or annihilate the exercise of its free efficacy. The rest of the Foundations deduces the 
legal and political conditions of the possibility for the maintenance of the relation of right.31 
Natural rights, penal and civil legislation and the constitution are all designed to maintain the 
equilibrium of the relation of right.  
In the Introduction, I claimed that Fichte’s account of recognition in the Foundations 
is not concerned with recognition as a ‘moral attitude’. The term ‘moral attitude’, as I propose 
to use it here, refers to an attitude of respect towards a person or institution. This attitude is 
prompted by certain characteristics that the person or institution possesses and is not 
motivated ultimately by self-interest. The adjective ‘moral’ is not intended to suggest Kantian 
Moralität as opposed to Hegelian Sittlichkeit, and could be replaced by ‘ethical’. On one 
reading, to say that recognition is a ‘moral attitude’ would be to say that recognition is an 
attitude in which a subject evinces respect for another subject’s unconditional worth. On such 
a reading, the Aufforderung would be seen as giving rise to an unconditional moral obligation 
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to respect the other. Now in his System of Ethics of 1798 Fichte does conceive of mutual 
recognition and the Aufforderung as moral in the sense specified. The other constitutes an 
‘ought-not’ (Nichtsollen) beyond which the agent may not proceed and the agent’s limitation 
by the other ‘contains within itself an absolute prohibition against disturbing the freedom of 
the other, a command to consider the other as self-sufficient, and absolutely not to use him as 
a means for my own ends’.32 This unconditional command to respect the other indicates that 
the recognition in question is a moral attitude.  
Now it might be tempting to think that in the Foundations Fichte is concerned with 
recognition as a moral attitude. However, I think that we should resist this temptation. For 
although Fichte’s conception of free activity as a capacity to set ends and to will to realize 
them may suggest Kant’s notion of ‘humanity’ (Menschheit), Fichte explicitly states that the 
concept of right—which denotes the relationship of mutual recognition—has ‘nothing to do 
with the moral law’, being ‘deduced without it’.33 He notes that the question as to whether the 
moral law might provide a ‘new sanction’ for the concept of right is not a question for the 
doctrine of right but for an ‘account of real morality’ (which is, presumably, provided in the 
System of Ethics).34 Within the domain of right, Fichte claims, ‘physical force—and it alone—
gives right its sanction’.35 The notion that physical force gives right its sanction is further 
developed in Fichte’s discussion of ‘coercion’ (Zwang) and the ‘right of coercion’ 
(Zwangsrecht). Fichte argues that agents who do not act in accordance with the principle of 
right can be rightfully coerced to do so. That is, an agent can be coerced to recognize any 
agent it might encounter where to recognize an agent is to restrict one’s freedom through the 
concept of the possibility of its freedom. To say that recognition can be coerced is to say that 
the threat or implementation of force can produce a will to act that was not previously present 
in the agent. It produces that will by threatening to prejudice the agent’s self-interest and the 
resultant recognition is motivated by self-interest.36 On a broadly Kantian construal of the 
adjective ‘moral’, an attitude that is motivated by self-interest is ipso facto not a moral 
attitude. I thus conclude that in the Foundations Fichte is not concerned with recognition as a 
moral attitude. But if this conclusion is correct we are faced with the following question: 
‘What sort of recognition is Fichte concerned with?’. 
In order to answer this question it is useful to consider Stephen Darwall’s discussion 
of ‘recognition respect’ in his path-breaking paper ‘Two Kinds of Respect’. Darwall defines 
‘recognition respect’, which he distinguishes from ‘appraisal respect’, as ‘a disposition to 
weigh appropriately some feature or fact in one’s deliberations’.37 He then proceeds to 
distinguish between two specific types of recognition respect: ‘moral recognition respect’ in 
which appropriate deliberation results in the limitation of the agent’s class of morally 
permissible actions; and what we might call ‘prudential recognition respect’ in which 
appropriate deliberation results in the limitation of the class of prudential actions. Such 
‘respect’ is motivated by self-interest alone.38 The type of recognition Fichte has in mind is 
clearly of the latter type. My recognition of the ‘fact’ of the other’s capacity for free activity 
limits what it is prudent for me to do: it is imprudent for me to violate or impede the other’s 
capacity for free activity as this may lead to the violation of my capacity for free activity.  
Given our discussion of Fichte’s separation between right and morality, this should 
come as no surprise. Nevertheless, several authors, including Darwall himself, have insisted 
that in the Foundations Fichte is concerned with recognition as a moral attitude.39 Thus whilst 
Robert Williams acknowledges Fichte’s separation between right and morality, he presents 
Fichte as arguing that ‘right is grounded in and conferred by mutual recognition and respect’. 
As Williams’ comparison between Levinas and Fichte suggests, he conceives of the respect in 
question as a moral attitude.40 Because Williams conceives of recognition as a moral attitude 
he is committed to the claim that Fichte’s discussion of coercion is inconsistent with his 
conception of recognition.41 If, as I have suggested, one takes Fichte to be concerned with 
recognition as prudential recognition respect the appearance of inconsistency is removed. 
Furthermore, one is not led to regard a substantial section of the Foundations as an aberration. 
Frederick Neuhouser also conceives of recognition as a moral attitude when he argues, in 
‘Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality’, that Fichtean agents ‘value’ their 
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‘individual freedom’ and ‘regard it as worthy of respect from others’.42 Neuhouser bases his 
conception of recognition upon an interpretation of the nature of the domain of right which is 
quite different to the one advanced here. If Neuhouser’s interpretation is correct it might be 
seen to constitute a serious objection to my claim that Fiche’s account of recognition in the 
domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. A discussion of 
Neuhouser’s interpretation is therefore necessary.  
 
3. Neuhouser on the domain of right 
In ‘Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality’ Neuhouser argues that the 
domain of right serves to constitute, secure and promote a distinct species of value which is 
reducible neither to self-interest nor morality. This value is ‘individuality’ or ‘personhood’ (or 
‘personality’—Persönlichkeit) and the imperative appropriate to the domain of right is thus, 
Neuhouser claims, ‘“Foster the realization of free, self-conscious individuality!”’.43 What is 
recognized in the domain of right is the value of individuality and the recognition in question 
seems to be a species of what we have called, following Darwall, ‘moral recognition respect’. 
I take the other into consideration in my deliberations not because it is in my self-interest to 
do so, but because I acknowledge and respect the value of individuality that the other 
instantiates. Neuhouser’s interpretation of the nature of the domain of right thus justifies the 
claim that recognition in the domain of right is a moral attitude.  
Whilst Neuhouser’s interpretation is of considerable interest, I think that his main 
argument in support of it is not conclusive. Neuhouser’s argument focuses upon Fichte’s 
transcendental argument in support of the claim that ‘original rights’ (Urrechte) are 
‘conditions of personality’, that is, necessary conditions of the agent’s conception of itself as 
an individual. According to Neuhouser, Fichte’s transcendental argument rests upon ‘a subtle 
but significant shift in the concept of individuality’.44 This ‘shift’ occurs when Fichte adds to 
the claim that the individual must conceive of itself as ‘a unit of causal efficacy’ (the phrase is 
Neuhouser’s) the claim that the individual must possess ‘an exclusive sphere of freedom that 
other free beings are proscribed by right from entering’.45 The transcendental argument is 
only plausible, Neuhouser points out, if the second claim is true. For if the individual must 
possess an exclusive sphere of freedom then there must be principles which guarantee that 
agents cannot violate that sphere, that is, there must be ‘original rights’. If, however, only the 
first claim is true, then such principles will not be necessary because the violation of such a 
sphere ‘does not, strictly speaking, threaten one’s status as a unit of causal efficacy’.46 In 
other words, if the individual is conceived merely as a ‘unit of causal efficacy’ then the claim 
that original rights are conditions of personality (or individuality) is patently false. The truth 
of this claim would seem to depend upon the truth of the claim that the individual must 
possess an exclusive sphere of freedom. This latter claim could be true, Neuhouser argues, if 
‘individuality’ were to be understood in a richer sense, where individuality is a sui generis 
value that can ‘flourish’ and be ‘promoted’. Neuhouser thinks that such a conception of 
individuality is presupposed by Fichte’s argument:  
 
I believe that the most compelling reading of Fichte’s position is one that attributes to him the 
recognition that personhood [or individuality] (and its realization in the world through the 
realm of right) is an end in itself that can be understood as valuable independently of its 
relation to the moral sphere.47  
 
This is an abductive argument which purports to provide the best possible explanation for 
Fichte’s ‘subtle shift’, namely, that Fichte was motivated by a commitment to the value of 
individuality. However, the shift in question admits of another, equally ‘compelling’, 
interpretation.  
As Neuhouser rightly points out, the Fichtean agent’s conception of itself as a locus 
of free agency must be ‘stable and enduring’.48 Now it seems plausible to argue, following 
Philip Pettit, that in order for an agent’s self-conception to be stable and enduring the agent’s 
freedom must satisfy a counterfactual condition and the agent must be aware that its freedom 
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satisfies this condition.49 That is, it is not enough that the agent is free in the actual world 
where the attitudes of others are congenial to the realization of its intentions. It must also be 
free in those relevantly similar possible worlds where others are hostile to, and wish to 
interfere with, the agent’s realization of its intentions. If this counterfactual condition is not 
satisfied the agent may enjoy freedom as non-interference, but this freedom will be vulnerable 
to the arbitrary interference of other agents. In other words, the agent’s freedom must be what  
Pettit has called ‘resilient non-interference’—it must be ‘copperfastened’ against the possible 
interference of others.50 On this understanding of freedom the antonym of freedom is not 
interference as such, but ‘subjection’ or ‘vulnerability’ to the arbitrary will of another.51  
According to Pettit, if the agent’s freedom is resilient and the agent is aware of this then 
certain consequences follow. Of these, two are directly relevant to our discussion. The first is 
that the agent will be ‘secure’, and be aware that it is ‘secure’, from the arbitrary interference 
of others. It will not have to keep ‘looking over its shoulder’ for possible interferers. The 
second is that the agent will possess, and be aware that it possesses, a ‘province’ that is 
protected from such interference. Within this domain, the agent will be free to exercise the 
traditional liberties. It will be, as Pettit puts it, its ‘own boss’.52  
 It seems to me that Fichte conceives of freedom as resilient non-interference rather 
than as non-interference tout court. That this is the case is suggested by Fichte’s emphasis 
upon the ‘security’ (Sicherheit) of agents against interference and his claim that an agent 
should never be subject to the arbitrary will of others.53 It is also suggested by Fichte’s claim 
that the individual must regard its freedom as something that it will enjoy for the entirety of 
its future existence.54 It is not enough, for Fichte, that the individual enjoys non-interference 
here and now. It must be the case that the agent would enjoy non-interference even if, as Pettit 
puts it, the ‘identities and motives and opportunities’ of other agents were to change.55 If 
Fichte is committed to the notion of freedom as resilient non-interference, then it is easy to 
see how, on this conception of freedom, the agent’s conception of itself as a free being will be 
‘stable and enduring’. It is also easy to see how the agent would regard itself as possessing a 
sphere for the exercise of its free activity from which others are, in principle, excluded. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that it is in relation to the demand that the individual regard 
itself as free for the entirety of its future existence that Fichte emphasizes the notion of 
‘exclusion’.56 On this alternative reading, Fichte’s talk of exclusion does not presuppose a 
commitment to the value of individuality; it presupposes a commitment to a conception of 
freedom as resilient non-interference.57  
It seems to me that such a reading provides a compelling alternative explanation of 
the shift in Fichte’s argument. There is thus no need, absenting further evidence, to introduce 
the notion that the domain of right is dedicated to the promotion of the sui generis value of 
individuality, and thus no need to invent a type of recognition corresponding to this value.   
 I hope that the preceding discussion has established, or at least made plausible, the 
claim that in the Foundations Fichte is concerned with recognition as prudential self-
limitation. Still, it seems odd to think that this is the only type of recognition with which a  
theory of natural right should be concerned. Indeed, it seems plausible to think that there is a 
type of recognition which is ‘moral’—insofar as it evinces respect for the worth of another 
rational being—and ‘political’—insofar as it has implications for the structure and 
organization of the public sphere. Such a conception of recognition is central to the work of 
contemporary theorists of the ‘politics of recognition’ such as Honneth, Taylor, Todorov, 
Ricoeur and Margalit. I suspect that it also underpins those interpretations of Fichte that 
present recognition in the domain of right as a moral attitude. Yet such a conception of 
recognition is not, so I have argued, present in Fichte’s work. Nevertheless, Fichte 
occasionally seems to acknowledge the existence of a type of recognition that is both moral 
and political. A case in point is Fichte’s discussion of ‘honour’ (Ehre) and ‘dishonourable 
deeds’.58 Fichte defines ‘honour’ as the belief that someone is ‘faithful and trustworthy in 
cases where the state cannot guarantee anything’. Dishonourable deeds are acts which violate 
agreements, explicit or tacit, that are founded upon good faith. As an agent’s inner intentions 
are not available for public scrutiny, honour falls outside of the domain of natural right and 
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the jurisdiction of the state. Nevertheless, insofar as dishonourable deeds such as failing to 
repay loans or breaking informal contracts threaten the security of citizens, the state has a 
duty to protect them from such deeds. It discharges this duty by ‘naming and shaming’ people 
known to be dishonourable. The punishment for dishonorable deeds shall, Fichte declares, be 
‘infamy’. But he then adds the following parenthesis: 
 
And only for such deeds; for the state cannot change people’s opinions, especially if they are 
grounded in human nature as those discussed here. Voltaire […] suggests that duelling 
[Zweikampf] be punished with infamy. This is impossible, for human beings cannot be made 
to regard as dishonourable someone who risks his life [der sich selbst in die gleiche 
Lebensgefahr setzt] to the same degree that his opponent does (although one may very well 
think he is foolish); just as, by contrast, everyone thinks that treacherous murder is 
dishonourable.59 
 
This parenthesis, I suggest, indicates the shortcomings of Fichte’s account of recognition in 
the Foundations. For the public’s alleged attitude to duelling, as well as the attitude of the 
combatants towards one another, would seem to point to a type of recognition that is not 
prudential. This type of recognition seems to be distinctly moral insofar as it consists in 
esteem and regard for someone’s integrity and character. The combatants are willing to risk 
their lives for the recognition of their integrity and it is precisely by risking their lives that 
they elicit this recognition from the public. Insofar as this acknowledgement is related to a 
public contest for honour and standing, it would seem to merit consideration within political 
philosophy. Fichte can devote no more than a parenthesis to it because honour falls beyond 
the purview of his philosophy of right. Fichte’s discussion of honour thus reveals possibilities 
that his account of recognition does not, and indeed cannot, exploit. In the System of Ethical 
Life, Hegel will exploit these possibilities to develop a powerful critique of Fichte’s account 
of recognition. It is to a discussion of this work that we now turn. 
 
4. Hegel on recognition and ethical life 
The System of Ethical Life is composed of an ascending series of stages which Hegel, 
borrowing Schelling’s terminology, calls ‘powers’ or ‘levels’—Potenzen. Each Potenz is 
characterized in terms of the relation of subsumption between ‘concept’ (Begriff) and 
‘intuition’ (Anschauung), where ‘concept’ seems to denote multiplicity or division and 
‘intuition’ to denote unity. The work is divided into three main parts: ‘Ethical Life according 
to Relation’ or ‘natural ethical life’60, ‘The Negative, or Freedom, or Crime’ and ‘Ethical 
Life’.  
 It is my claim that the entire text can be read profitably as a critical engagement with 
Fichte’s theory of natural right which focuses upon his account of recognition. The first 
section, natural ethical life, shows that Fichte’s account of recognition cannot fulfill the 
function Fichte wants it to. The second section, the Negative, shows the collapse of Fichtean 
recognition and its transformation into a new, higher form of recognition. The third section, 
which presents Hegel’s positive account of ethical life, integrates both the new form of 
recognition and Fichtean recognition into an account of the constitution and the government. 
For the purposes of this paper, I do not propose to vindicate this claim in full. Nor shall I 
discuss Hegel’s treatment of love as a mode of intersubjectivity and his fascinating discussion 
of language. I shall simply focus upon Hegel’s critique of Fichte as it is developed in the first 
two sections—Natural ethical life and the Negative—and the conception of recognition which 
emerges from this critique. 
 Natural ethical life deals with the striving of the individual to recover the lost unity of 
nature and thereby return to the ‘absolute’.61 The discussion of this attempt is divided into two 
stages: ‘Feeling as Subsumption of Concept under Intuition’ and ‘Of Infinity and Ideality in 
Form or in Relation’.  
It is in the second level—‘Of Infinity and Ideality in Form or in Relation’—that 
Hegel’s first criticism of Fichte begins to take shape. In the first level, ‘individuality’ was the 
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ruling principle. The individual worked upon nature to satisfy his particular needs, his work 
becoming more universal as its developed. In the second level, by contrast, the universal is 
dominant, although it is merely a ‘formal’ universal, by which Hegel seems to mean a 
universal which does not penetrate and inform the particular but imposes an external form 
upon it. This formal universal organizes and structures the particular, regulating the various 
relations within it. In this process, the activity of labour is regulated and made uniform. A 
division of labour emerges as tasks are simplified and distributed amongst the population. 
Labour becomes ‘wholly quantitative and without variety’ and this facilitates the 
mechanization of the process of production.62 Insofar as the individual’s labour has been 
reduced to a general type of labour it is severed from his real needs. The same is true of the 
abstract product of his labour which is his possession. Having no use-value for the agent it 
becomes a ‘surplus’ for him. However, other agents may need his possession to satisfy their 
needs and Hegel thus claims that its ‘bearing to use is […] a universal one’.63 In other words, 
the fact that the individual’s product may be desired by others establishes a network of 
possible relations to other individuals. The individual can then alienate his possession in 
exchange for products that satisfy his needs. Upon entering into this network of possible 
relations, the individual is recognized as a property owner and thus enters into the sphere of 
right. The individual thus becomes a ‘person’—a free being that possesses rights. Right serves 
to guarantee private property and to regulate relations of exchange between persons. It also 
ensures the equality of legal persons: everyone, simply by virtue of being a locus of free 
efficacy, is entitled to the same treatment as everyone else.  
All this sounds very Fichtean. However, it is here that Hegel exposes what he thinks 
to be a weakness in Fichte’s account of recognition. Fichte’s account of recognition seeks to 
establish equal treatment for all rational agents, irrespective of class or race. According to 
Fichte, a rational agent is entitled to equal treatment simply by virtue of his capacity for free 
activity. Now Hegel’s claim, I suggest, is that the sort of equality that Fichte establishes is 
merely a ‘formal’ or ‘ideal’ equality, which is compatible with real relations of domination 
and subordination. Fichte conceives of individuals as the bearers of an abstract capacity—the 
capacity for free activity. He seeks to establish equality between these individuals by 
constructing a system of right which partially restricts every individual’s exercise of free 
activity to the same extent, thereby securing the equal freedom of all. But what Fichte fails to 
realize is that within such a system of coercion and constraint, individuals can exercise their 
remaining freedom to a greater or lesser extent, and that this may give rise to relations of 
domination and subordination. At this level, Hegel claims: 
 
a living individual confronts a living individual, but their power (Potenz) of life is unequal. 
Thus one is might or power over the other.64  
 
This inequality of ‘power of life’ inevitably leads to a relationship of ‘lordship and bondage’ 
in which the weaker is subordinate to the stronger. This relation will arise, Hegel suggests, 
irrespective of the merely juridical equality advocated by Fichte: 
 
At this point there is no question of any right or any necessary equality. Equality is nothing 
but an abstraction—it is the formal thought of life […] and this thought is purely ideal and 
without reality. In reality, on the other hand, it is the inequality of life that is established, and 
therefore the relation [of lordship] and bondage. For in reality what we have is shape and 
individuality and appearance, and consequently difference of power (Potenz) and might, or 
the relative identity where one individual is posited as indifferent and the other as different.65  
 
We thus have a relationship of lordship and bondage between an indifferent or ‘independent’ 
(to use the language of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit) consciousness and a different or 
‘dependent’ consciousness. We might think that the power in question here is physical 
strength and that the relation has arisen through combat. We might think that Hegel is simply 
claiming that, as a matter of fact, some individuals are more physically powerful than others. 
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However, this is not what Hegel is claiming as can be seen from his claim that ‘the greater 
strength or weakness is nothing but the fact that one of them is caught up in difference, fixed 
and determined in some way that the other is not’.66 The ‘difference’ in which the weaker 
party is caught is, as H. S. Harris points out, the difference between need and the satisfaction 
of need.67 The weaker party is dependent upon the stronger for the satisfaction of need, and 
must provide service in return for a part of the stronger party’s surplus. As Hegel puts it: 
 
The master is in possession of a surplus, of what is physically necessary; the servant lacks it, 
and indeed in such a way that the surplus and the lack are not single [accidental] aspects but 
the indifference of necessary needs.68 
  
Thus, the relationship of lordship and bondage is an economic relationship of domination and 
subordination, and is not—at this stage—the conclusion of a life and death struggle. Indeed, it 
is important to Hegel’s criticism of Fichte that it is an economic relationship, for Hegel wants 
to show that Fichtean recognition is compatible with gross inequality. Fichte’s ‘system of 
property and right’ may ensure that its members are equally recognized as producers and 
property owners, but it does not prevent the emergence of economic servitude. Of course, one 
might object that Hegel’s criticism turns upon the thought that there is something degrading 
about economic servitude, and that Fichte would regard this as a matter for morality. But 
Hegel’s criticism does not turn upon this thought alone. It also turns upon the thought that 
economic servitude is a relationship in which one subject is at the mercy of another subject 
(or subjects). It is a relationship in which a subject is dependent upon, and vulnerable to, the 
arbitrary will of another subject (or subjects). And Fichte would regard this as a problem, 
insofar as his ‘system of property and right’ is designed to safeguard all agents against such 
vulnerability and dependence.69 Hegel has thus shown that Fichte’s conception of recognition 
cannot achieve what it is designed to achieve: it establishes an abstract equality which is 
compatible with, and which to a certain extent facilitates, gross economic inequality. It 
establishes, in short, freedom in economic chains. 
 The inequality of economic mastery and servitude is overcome in the patriarchal 
family which is, Hegel asserts, ‘the highest unity of which nature is capable’. The family has 
the appearance of inequality, insofar as the father is master of the house. However, its inner 
essence is unity, the family living a shared life in which property is held in common.  
 Hegel’s discussion of the family concludes the section on natural ethical life, and he 
now turns to the section entitled ‘The Negative, or Freedom, or Crime’. This section negates 
the ‘particularity’ of the relations established in the previous section, thereby raising them to 
the universality of ethical life proper. It is in this section that Hegel discusses the relationship 
between ‘crime’ (Verbrechen) and recognition. Whereas ‘havoc’ is wholesale destruction of 
natural ethical life, crime is an attack on another rational being. The abstract universal relation 
of right is of no concern to the criminal; he violates the freedom of a particular person in 
order to satisfy a particular need. However, the relation of right still exists, irrespective of the 
criminal’s concerns or intentions. Hegel thus claims that in violating the freedom of another, 
the criminal is simultaneously ‘nullifying’ recognition, attacking the individual as an abstract 
subject of right. The criminal thus nullifies, whether he is aware of it or not, the relationship 
of legal recognition discussed by Hegel in the previous section. In other words, the criminal 
nullifies Fichtean recognition. The criminal’s nullification of recognition raises the issue of 
punishment, and it is here, I suggest, that Hegel’s second criticism of Fichte begins.  
 In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte discusses punishment in considerable 
detail. In the ‘Third main division’, he argues that prior to the contractual establishment of the 
state, each subject has a ‘right of coercion’ which he may exercise if another subject violates 
his rights, and thus fails to recognize him. However, in the absence of a third party, the 
exercise of this right of coercion may lead to conflict. The individual may punish the 
offending party excessively, or the offending party may think that he has been punished 
excessively. This may lead to retaliation and ultimately a state of war. The possibility of 
conflict necessitates the alienation of this right to a third party, which is ultimately the state 
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authority. Now it is interesting to note Fichte’s explanation as to why, in the absence of such 
an authority, the victim of crime may be led to punish the other excessively. According to 
Fichte, the victim of crime punishes the other excessively because he has no guarantee that 
the other will restrict his free activity and bring his behaviour into conformity with the law of 
right.70 He cannot trust the other to do this as, ex hypothesi, the other cannot be trusted. He 
thus continues to punish the other in order to guarantee his security. The excessive 
punishment is thus motivated by a desire to secure his welfare.  
What Fichte’s account overlooks is that there may be another explanation for 
excessive punishment, and it is this alternative explanation that is at the heart of Hegel’s 
criticism. According to Hegel, the crime, however trivial, is experienced by the victim as an 
injury to his entire personality, as an attack upon his status as a free rational being. Or, as 
Hegel puts it, he experiences the injury as an attack upon his ‘honour’ (Ehre). ‘Through 
honour’, Hegel writes: 
 
the singular detail becomes something personal and a whole, and what is seemingly only the 
denial of a detail is an injury of the whole.71  
 
The crime is thus experienced by the victim as an attack upon his honour and he seeks to 
restore this honour by subjugating and dominating the criminal. Taking the example of theft, 
Hegel claims that the victim seeks to restore his honour by making the thief his ‘bond slave’ 
(Knecht). And he is prepared to go to any length to achieve this, having made ‘this personal 
injury a matter of his entire personality’.72 He does not need to go very far, however, as the 
thief willingly capitulates. This is because the thief is only concerned with satisfying his 
particular needs and thus, Hegel writes, ‘posits himself as particularity only’. Because of this 
capitulation, a genuine relation of lordship and bondage does not emerge; the thief, Hegel 
claims, ‘is too bad to be a slave, for he has not justified any trust in his entire personality’.73 
He has not justified such trust, Hegel suggests, because he has not demonstrated his 
independence of material needs and finite concerns. He can only demonstrate this if he is 
prepared to risk his life, and thus his personality, in resisting the victim’s attack.74 If the 
criminal is willing to take this risk ‘there arises’, Hegel claims, ‘a battle [Kampf] of one whole 
person against another whole person’, a struggle for recognition.75 In such a struggle both 
combatants risk their lives, and this risk demonstrates an independence of finite material 
concerns and interests. In risking their lives the combatants prove that they value their 
freedom more than finite existence and worldly concerns.  
This uprooting of both combatants from the realm of the finite establishes a 
relationship of equality between them, an equality quite unlike the spurious equality of 
Fichtean right. As ‘whole persons’ the combatants are equal, and the cause of the conflict 
becomes trivial. It simply does not matter who committed the crime or even whether what 
triggered the conflict would ordinarily be recognized as a crime.76 It is interesting to note that 
for Fichtean right it does matter who committed the crime, and that the relation between 
criminal and victim is unequal, the criminal being subject to coercion. In the previous section, 
natural ethical life, Fichtean equality was shown to be compatible with real inequality. Here, 
by contrast, Fichtean inequality is shown to be compatible with real equality—the equality 
between opponents who are willing to risk their lives for honour.  
 The life and death struggle may result in a relationship of lordship and bondage. This 
is quite different from the economic lordship and bondage of the previous section insofar as it 
results from the superior ‘might’ (Gewalt) of one of the combatants. As Hegel puts it: ‘might 
individualized as strength […] decides who dominates’.77 Unfortunately, Hegel says little 
more about the relationship of lordship and bondage and provides no account, as he does in 
the Phenomenology, of the paradoxical nature of the relationship.  
 The recognition that is at issue in Hegel’s account of crime is clearly quite different 
from the recognition that is at issue in Fichte’s account of natural right. As I have argued, 
Fichte conceives of recognition in the domain of right as a self-interested restriction of free 
activity. Hegel, by contrast, thinks that there is a type of recognition in the domain of right 
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that is distinctly moral in character. This type of recognition consists in esteem for the 
integrity and character of another free rational being.78 The criminal’s act was taken to 
express a lack of such esteem and it was this that triggered the struggle for recognition.  
  Hegel has thus shown that Fichte’s conception of recognition must, in the experience 
of crime, give way to a higher, distinctively moral, form of recognition. Hegel thinks that the 
experience of crime is the catalyst for this transformation. The victim experiences the crime 
not as an impediment to his self-interested activity, but as a moral injury, an attack upon his 
honour. This experience of crime as a moral injury is something that Fichte cannot, given his 
separation between right and morality, accommodate within his philosophy of right. Yet 
insofar as this experience of crime is a source of social conflict and dispute, it seems to be 
something that Fichte’s political philosophy should accommodate. As we saw earlier, the 
phenomenon of duelling raised problems for Fichte’s separation of right and morality insofar 
as both the observers and the combatants evinced  distinctively moral attitudes: esteem for the 
opponents on the part of the observers; a demand for esteem and the restoration of honour on 
the part of the combatants. Now if Hegel’s account of the experience of crime is correct, a 
concern with honour is not restricted to the anachronistic practice of duelling it is, like crime 
itself, an ineluctable part of social life. But if this is the case, Fichte’s strict separation 
between right and morality appears to be unsustainable. Crime ruptures the boundary between 
right and morality insofar as the experience of crime can motivate a demand for esteem, a 
demand that Fichte wishes to consign to the domain of morality. And with the rupture of this 
boundary there arises a new conception of recognition in which the freedom of the ‘whole 
person’ is at stake. On Hegel’s account it is not, pace Fichte, just the participants in a duel 
who are willing to risk their lives for honour. Any subject who truly values his freedom is 
prepared to take this risk.  
 Hegel is, of course, aware that not everyone will be prepared to risk their lives for the 
sake of honour. Many subjects will, despite experiencing crime as a moral affront, be more 
concerned with re-establishing their security and receiving compensation for their material 
losses. As such, they remain Fichtean persons, concerned with the finite and particular. The 
recognition appropriate to them is recognition as prudential non-interference with the freedom 
of others. Some subjects, however, will be prepared to risk their lives for honour, and the 
recognition appropriate to them is recognition as esteem for their integrity. Although Hegel 
initially presents these subjects as motivated by a desire for personal honour, his account does 
not stop there. For these subjects are part of the family, an organic unity which prefigures the 
unity of ethical life proper. And it is in the family feud that they learn to risk their lives for the 
honour of the whole. The recognition they demand is recognition as members of a 
community.  
 Hegel has thus provided two criticisms of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 
domain of right. In the first criticism, he argued that Fichtean recognition only amounts to 
legal equality and that this equality is compatible with gross economic inequality. In the 
second criticism he argues that in the experience of crime a different type of recognition 
emerges, moral recognition of the whole person. This new type of recognition shatters 
Fichte’s distinction between right and morality.  
 
Conclusion 
I hope that the preceding discussion has gone some way toward vindicating my claim that the 
System of Ethical Life can be read as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 
Foundations of Natural Right. I also hope that it has brought to light a key difference between 
the Hegelian and Fichtean accounts of recognition. Fichte’s account of recognition in the 
domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. It is concerned with 
recognition as a prudential self-restriction of free activity on the part of self-interested agents. 
Hegel’s great contribution to the ‘politics of recognition’ is to have demonstrated that such an 
account is unsatisfactory. For Hegel, as for modern theorists of recognition, a plausible 
account of recognition in the political realm must be concerned with recognition as a moral 
attitude.79  
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